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WHY DID BELGIUM PAY LEOPOLD’S 
BONDS? 
KIM OOSTERLINCK, JOSEPH BLOCHER & MITU GULATI* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
King Leopold II’s horrific abuse of the Congo Free State (CFS) was a 
humanitarian disaster of incalculable proportions,1 and inspired what has been 
called the first great international human rights campaign of the twentieth 
century.2 This campaign—which united humanitarian and commercial 
interests3—eventually forced Leopold to sell the CFS to Belgium, transforming 
Congo from a private colony to a public one.4 
Scholars have long noted the ways in which international law—including basic 
conceptions of sovereignty—shaped and were shaped by the rise and fall of the 
CFS. How, for example, should law account for the kind of private empire that 
Leopold ruled?5 Both he and Belgium were careful to separate Leopold’s roles 
as monarch of Belgium and as the owner and king of CFS.6 Indeed, Leopold 
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 1.  See generally ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR 
AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA (1998), for a discussion of King Leopold’s despotism in Africa. 
 2.  E.g., id. at 2; JASON STEARNS, DANCING IN THE GLORY OF MONSTERS: THE COLLAPSE OF 
THE CONGO AND THE GREAT WAR OF AFRICA 7 (2011). 
 3.  See, e.g., MARTIN EWANS, EUROPEAN ATROCITY, AFRICAN CATASTROPHE: LEOPOLD II, THE 
CONGO FREE STATE AND ITS AFTERMATH 217–18 (2002) (describing how reports on both the 
humanitarian crisis and severe trade restrictions helped change Belgian public sentiment regarding the 
CFS); THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: THE WHITE MAN’S CONQUEST OF THE 
DARK CONTINENT FROM 1876 TO 1912, at 586 (1990) (“What was new was that these humanitarians had 
now joined hands with the men of commerce, God with Mammon.”). 
 4.  See generally Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Transferable Sovereignty: Lessons from the History 
of the Congo Free State, 69 DUKE L.J. 1219 (2020), for a more complete account of the forced sale, and 
an argument that the forced sale has important lessons for international law. 
 5.  See generally STEVEN PRESS, ROGUE EMPIRES: CONTRACTS AND CONMEN IN EUROPE’S 
SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA, 165–218 (2017) (describing Leopold’s eventually successful effort to convince 
the global powers to recognize his corporation’s private ownership of the Congo). 
 6.  The relationship between property and sovereignty in the context of the CFS raises many 
complicated questions, which this Article cannot fully address. It is worth noting, though, that Leopold 
explicitly demanded that the treaties his representatives signed with native Congolese included articles 
that “delegate to us their sovereign rights over the territories which are the subject of the said conventions . . . 
. . The treaties must be as brief as possible and in a couple of articles must grant us everything.” EWANS, 
supra note 3, at 71 (emphasis added). 
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pursued the colony in his private capacity precisely because Belgium did not want 
a colony of its own,7 and he governed it like private property, refusing to reveal 
even the most basic information about his rule.8 How complicit was the 
international law community in effectively recognizing a private sovereignty that 
merged the roles of sovereign and proprietor?9 
That legal recognition, in turn, helped to construct—or at least enable—
certain kinds of markets. Much has been written about “red rubber,” and the 
ways in which Leopold’s voracious pursuit of wealth ruined millions of Congolese 
lives.10 How many lives were lost, and who actually reaped the benefits, remain 
topics of scholarly and public debate.11 But markets also enabled the horrors in 
the CFS in a more direct but less recognized way: they provided the funds—via 
the sovereign debt markets—to establish and run the country in the first place. 
Especially in the early years, Leopold relied heavily on bond markets to finance 
his sovereign enterprise; when Belgium acquired the colony in 1908, it also 
acquired—or at least paid—the CFS bonds.12 The question that interests us has 
to do with the willingness of the markets to fund Leopold’s genocidal enterprise. 
Under the doctrine of odious debts,13 one might expect the CFS debts to be a 
prime candidate for repudiation: the debts were clearly undertaken without the 
consent, and indeed to the detriment, of the Congolese people, and were used to 
enrich Leopold himself. And yet there seems to have been no realistic 
 
 7.  See PRESS, supra note 5, at 84 (noting King Leopold’s wish to expand Belgium’s control, and the 
domestic opposition he faced). 
 8.  As King Leopold II said before handing over the colony in November 1908, “I will give them my 
Congo, but they have no right to know what I have done there!” ROGER ANSTEY, KING LEOPOLD’S 
LEGACY: THE CONGO UNDER BELGIAN RULE 1908-1960, at 272 (1996). See also HOCHSCHILD, supra 
note 1, at 258 (stating that, in King Leopold’s words, the CFS was “not beholden to anyone except to its 
founder . . . . No one ha[d] the right to ask for its accounts”). 
 9.  See, e.g., MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960, at 155–56 (2002) (“Perhaps the most striking effort to create 
European sovereignty—and the greatest disappointment about the civilizing mission—can be gleaned in 
the story of the ‘Independent State of the Congo,’ created in 1884-85 in part by the private activity of 
King Léopold II of the Belgians and in part by the concerted action of European powers.”); CARL 
SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM 
214–26 (G.L. Ulmen trans., Telos Press 2003) (1950) (using the CFS to illustrate the disintegration of a 
spatial legal order). 
 10.  See generally EDMUND D. MOREL, RED RUBBER: THE STORY OF THE RUBBER SLAVE TRADE 
FLOURISHING ON THE CONGO IN THE YEAR OF GRACE 1906 (1907) (providing a contemporary report 
of King Leopold’s wealth-driven atrocities in the Congo, and its effect on the millions in the region). 
 11.  See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 225–26 (noting the difficulty of the “historical detective 
work” necessary to estimate a true figure of lives lost during the CFS). 
 12.  Robert Harms, King Leopold’s Bonds, in THE ORIGINS OF VALUE: THE FINANCIAL 
INNOVATIONS THAT CREATED MODERN CAPITAL MARKETS 343, 357 (William N. Goetzman & K. 
Geet Rouwenhorst eds., 2005). 
 13.  See JEFF KING, THE DOCTRINE OF ODIOUS DEBTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
RESTATEMENT 125 (2016) (summarizing governments’ ability to repudiate subjugation debts—those 
whose purpose is actively hostile to the major interests of the population of the debtor state). 
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consideration of this possibility, as we discuss in more detail in a separate paper 
investigating the contemporary scholarly, political, and legal debates.14 
But what about the markets themselves? An age-old question at the 
intersection of law, markets, and ethics is whether markets, even in the absence 
of legal sanctions, constrain certain types of bad behavior.15 In the equity context, 
there is a large body of empirical research asking whether so-called sin securities 
(for example, stocks in tobacco, gambling, and alcohol companies) suffer a 
market penalty. Some scholars find that they do.16 The reason for the penalty, 
scholars conjecture, is at least in part that enough investors care about the ethics 
of their investments to impose a price penalty on the companies in question.17 
That question is particularly salient in the case of sovereigns, given that there are 
few formal legal constraints on sovereigns doing bad things to their own people.18 
Our goal in this Article is to use King Leopold’s reign—as sinful as they come, 
and eventually recognized as such—to measure the market penalty for sin in the 
sovereign borrowing markets. In particular, we focus on the prices and yields to 
maturity (YTMs)19 on the loans issued by King Leopold on behalf of the CFS 
between 1885 and 1908. Data on that borrowing implicates two related questions 
about despotic sovereign borrowing. The first question is whether, once the 
despotism is revealed to the public, the markets begin to penalize the borrower. 
The second is whether the successor government to the despot receives a market 
reward for paying those creditors who funded the despot. 
The answers to these questions, in turn, may have much to tell us about law—
and, in particular, the doctrine of odious debts. On the one hand, a market 
penalty for sinful bonds might be taken as evidence of the doctrine’s existence: 
perhaps it signals concern that the debts will be repudiated by a successor. On 
 
 14.  Joseph Blocher, Kim Oosterlinck & Mitu Gulati, King Leopold’s Bonds and the Mystery of 
Odious Debts, 60 VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2020). 
 15.  See, for example, FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW (2015); Robert C. Hughes, 
Would Many People Obey Non-Coercive Law?, 9 JURIS. 361 (2018), for discussions on whether society 
may constrain conduct without legal sanctions. 
 16.  E.g., Stefano Collonello, Giuliano Curatola & Alessandro Gioffre, Pricing Sin Stocks: Ethical 
Preferences vs. Risk Aversion, 118 EUR. ECON. REV. 69 (2019); William Ming Yang Cheng & Desmond 
Lam, Comparing the Price of Sin: Abnormal Returns of Cross-Listed Gaming Stocks in the Hong Kong 
and US Markets, 45 INT’L J. HOSPITALITY MGMT. 73 (2015); Robert B. Durand, SzeeKee Koh & Paul L. 
Tan, The Price of Sin in the Pacific Basin 21 PAC. BASIN FIN. J. 899 (2013); Frank J. Fabozzi, K.C. Ma & 
Becky J. Oliphant, Sin Stock Returns, 35 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 82 (2008); Julie M. Salaber, The 
Determinants of Sin Stock Returns: Evidence on the European Markets, (2007 draft), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1071746 [https://perma.cc/N783-SSS2]. 
 17.  E.g., Harrison G. Hong & Marcin Kacperczyk, The Price of Sin: The Effect of Social Norms on 
Markets, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 15 (2009); Harrison G. Hong & Leonard Kostovetsky, Red and Blue Investing: 
Value and Finance, 103 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2012). 
 18.  Ugo Panizza, Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Economics and Law of 
Sovereign Debt and Default, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 651 (explaining that the primary constraints on 
opportunistic defaults by sovereign debtors have long been non legal). 
 19.  YTM represents the total return a bond will provide on its purchase price if held to maturity, 
expressed as an annual rate. This calculation provides a standard measure to gauge the returns of fixed-
income securities with differing expiries. See ZVI BODIE, ALEX KANE & ALAN J. MARCUS, 
INVESTMENTS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 479 (9th ed. 2011). 
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the other hand, if successor governments receive market rewards for paying 
despots’ debts, that may help explain why the doctrine is so hard to observe in 
practice—after all, the legal rights it creates are in the nature of an option, the 
exercise of which might not have sufficient value. Perhaps Belgium could have 
legally repudiated the debts, but had political or even moral reasons not to. This 
exemplifies a tough evidentiary problem for advocates of the odious debt 
doctrine, since the standard definition of customary international law requires 
evidence of nations following a rule out of a sense of legal obligation.20 If nations 
have no financial incentive to repudiate, the market will effectively hide any 
evidence of the legal rule.21 
To examine whether markets penalized King Leopold II’s despotism or 
rewarded Belgium for honoring the CFS bonds, this Article proceeds in five 
parts. Part II explains how sovereign debt markets may respond to despotism or 
incentivize payment of sinful debts using two contemporary examples. Part III 
describes prior research on the late nineteenth and early twentieth century debts 
of colonies (of which the CFS bonds are a part) and describes the Article’s 
dataset. Part IV analyzes the data and finds that sovereign debt markets neither 
penalized the CFS bonds once King Leopold’s despotism was uncovered, nor 
rewarded Belgium for continuing to honor the bonds after purchasing the CFS. 
Part V concludes. 
 
II 
MARKET RESPONSES TO DESPOTIC SOVEREIGNS 
To explicate the relevance of this inquiry, we begin with two contemporary 
and familiar examples: Venezuela in 2017 and South Africa in 1994, which neatly 
map onto the two questions we raised earlier. The first involves the markets’ 
treatment of despotic borrowers; the second involves the incentives of sovereigns 
to pay sinful debts. 
A. Sovereign Sin Penalties: Venezuela 2017 
On May 26, 2017, Harvard economist and former Venezuelan Finance 
Minister Ricardo Hausmann penned an op-ed titled “Venezuela’s Hunger 
Bonds.”22 The article urged investors to consider the humanitarian crisis in 
Venezuela; one that was being exacerbated by the Venezuelan government’s 
decision to pay coupons on its foreign debt obligations instead of purchasing 
 
 20.  See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 
202, 209 (2010) (“The standard definition of CIL [customary international law] is that it arises from the 
practices of nations followed out of a sense of legal obligation. Under this account, there are two elements 
to CIL: an objective state-practice element and a subjective sense-of-legal-obligation (or opinio juris) 
element.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 21.  We are grateful to the symposium participants for an engaging discussion on this point. 
 22.  Ricardo Hausmann, Venezuela’s Hunger Bonds, PROJECT SYNDICATE (May 26, 2017), 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/maduro-venezuela-hunger-bonds-by-ricardo-hausmann-
2017-05 [https://perma.cc/BU7T-T532]. 
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vitally necessary medicine and food for its people. The support that foreign bond 
investors were providing the Maduro government in Venezuela, Hausmann 
argued, had become a proximate cause of the crisis in that country. Hausmann 
appealed to the moral sentiments of investors, asking that they move their 
investments to less harmful settings.23 
Roughly around the same time, news came out that Goldman Sachs had 
purchased $2.8 billion in bonds of the Venezuelan state-owned oil company, 
Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), on May 23rd, just a few days prior to the 
publication of Hausmann’s op-ed.24 The purchase had been made at thirty-one 
cents on the dollar for a total price of $865 million, an exceptionally deep discount 
from the face value of the bonds.25 This was, in a sense, precisely the type of 
investment that Hausmann had pleaded with Wall Street not to make. Media 
reacted with outrage at the news of Goldman Sachs’s behavior and started 
referring to the PDVSA bond as the “Hunger Bond.”26 
The bond became a pariah. None of the big investors would touch it, which 
meant that the small investors did not want it either. The bond YTM rose almost 
500 basis points within the first five days from when the media storm broke and 
Goldman Sachs lost almost $50 million in the market value of its new asset (in 
addition to not being able to unload it).27 Two years later, in late 2019, the Hunger 
Bond still trades at a significant discount to other similar Venezuelan bonds.28 
The story of the Hunger Bond raises the question of whether the bond 
markets have reacted similarly in other situations, penalizing obviously sinful 
borrowing by sovereigns. That question is so important because there are 
relatively few formal legal constraints on unethical or sinful sovereign borrowing. 
Scholars and activists have been arguing for years that a doctrine of odious debts 
should be recognized by the international community,29 but those efforts have 
generally failed. To the extent social disapproval can work to substitute for the 
 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Jana Kasperkevic, What You Need to Know about Venezuela’s ‘Hunger Bonds’, MARKETPLACE 
(May 31, 2017), https://www.marketplace.org/2017/05/31/what-you-need-know-about-venezuela-s-
hunger-bonds/ [https://perma.cc/F5U2-3TSQ]. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  See, e.g., Kejal Vyas et al., Goldman Sachs Under Fire for Venezuela Bond Deal, WALL ST. J. 
(May 30, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/goldman-sachs-under-fire-for-venezuela-bond-deal-1496 
100583 [https://perma.cc/EVC5-52SQ]; Opinion, Banks Are Right to Shun Venezuela’s Hunger Bonds, 
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/0490f1e8-7e83-11e7-ab01-a13271d1ee9c 
[https://perma.cc/Z5F6-PS8F]. 
 27.  See generally Mitu Gulati & Ugo Panizza, The Hausmann-Gorky Effect, J. BUS. ETHICS 
(forthcoming 2019), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10551-019-04132-9 [https://perma.cc/ 
9M3L-LRMP], for a detailed discussion of the market response to the Hunger Bond revelations. 
 28.  Mark Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, The Puzzling Pricing of Venezuelan Bonds, CREDITSLIPS 
(Oct. 5, 2019, 3:32 PM), https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2019/10/the-puzzling-pricing-of-
venezuelan-sovereign-bonds.html [https://perma.cc/Q4CA-FMPN]. 
 29.  See generally Michael Kremer & Seema Jayachandran, Odious Debts, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 82 
(2006); Ricardo Hausmann & Ugo Panizza, Odiousness Ratings for Public Debt, PROJECT SYNDICATE 
(Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/odiousness-ratings-public-debt-by-
ricardo-hausmann-and-ugo-panizza-2017-08?barrier=accesspaylog [https://perma.cc/HB9A-8Z2G]. 
FINAL - OOSTERLINCK (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2020  3:56 PM 
54 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:49 
absence of a legal regime, perhaps this can be a useful tool for activists seeking 
to limit market support for regimes such as the current one in Caracas. Knowing 
the history of when and why social approval has either worked or not to impose 
a market penalty on bad sovereigns is important for anyone seeking to utilize this 
strategy. 
With respect to sovereign bonds, some studies have found that markets 
impose a YTM penalty on bonds that were either issued by despotic governments 
or whose proceeds were used for ill purposes.30 Most directly comparable to the 
Hunger Bond is the story told by economic historians Collet and Oosterlinck. 
They find that, in 1906, when the Russian Tsar issued a bond for which he had 
failed to obtain appropriate legislative approvals, the Tsar’s actions were severely 
criticized in the European press and the market imposed a significant penalty on 
the bond issuances.31 In a different article, Collet investigates the treatment of 
certain Spanish bonds backed by Cuban resources, whose proceeds had been 
used to put down the Cuban independence movement.32 She finds that, in the 
wake of the Spanish-American War, the markets imposed a steep discount on 
these particular bonds as compared to the other Spanish bonds whose proceeds 
were presumably used for more mundane purposes.33 In another article, 
Oosterlinck finds that the bonds issued by the Nazi-supported government of 
Vichy France traded at a discount to bonds issued by France’s prior legitimate 
government.34 
These findings return us to the story at the heart of this Article: that of the 
CFS. At the start of his venture in the CFS in the 1880s, Leopold claimed that his 
motives were benevolent and that he wanted to eradicate Arab slavery and bring 
civilization and free trade to the natives.35 Some might even have believed him. 
But by 1904 at the very latest,36 Leopold had been revealed to be the overlord of 
a regime that put profit above any humanitarian concerns (or constraints, for that 
matter).37 Relevant for our purposes is the fact that Leopold issued debt all 
 
 30.  More tangentially, there are a handful of papers investigating whether investors reward socially 
responsible sovereigns with lower YTM. E.g., Gunther Capelle-Blachard et al., Sovereign Bond Yield 
Spreads and Sustainability: An Empirical Analysis of OECD Countries, 98 J. BANKING & FIN. 156 (2019); 
Bastien Drut, Sovereign Bonds and Socially Responsible Investment, 92 J. BUS. ETHICS 131 (2010). 
 31.  Stephanie Collet & Kim Oosterlinck, Denouncing Odious Debts, 160 J. BUS. ETHICS 205, 217–
18 (2019). 
 32.  See generally Stephanie Collet, The Financial Penalty for “Unfair” Debt: The Case of Cuban 
Bonds at the Time of Independence, 17 EUR. REV. ECON. HIST. 364 (2013). 
 33.  Id. at 385. 
 34.  Kim Oosterlinck, The Bond Market and the Legitimacy of Vichy France, 40 EXPLORATIONS 
ECON. HIST. 326, 342–43 (2003). 
 35.  See generally EWANS, supra note 3, at 84–108 (describing Leopold’s eventually successful 
campaign to gain international recognition for his sovereign control of the Congo with the stated goals 
of ending the slave trade and bringing civilization and free trade to the region). 
 36.  See generally Blocher, Oosterlinck & Gulati, supra note 14 (exploring the timeline of the public 
understanding of Leopold’s motivations in the CFS). 
 37.  See EWANS, supra note 3, at 193 (quoting reformer and diplomat Roger Casement to the effect 
that “[t]he root of the evil lies in the fact that the government of the Congo is above all a commercial 
trust, that everything is orientated towards commercial gain”); see also PAKENHAM, supra note 3, at 661 
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through this period. This means that there are bonds that he issued in his early 
years (when the markets might have thought they were supporting a 
humanitarian venture) and those from the later years (when the venture had been 
revealed to be genocidal). Comparing the prices and YTMs on those bonds can 
give us a sense of whether the markets penalized the sinful bonds, as they did 
with the Hunger Bond in Venezuela and with the other despotic regimes 
analyzed. 
B. Successor Rewards: South Africa 1994 
In 1994, after years of internal struggle and widespread international 
condemnation, the apartheid government of South Africa was finally on its way 
out. The apartheid government had racked up nearly $20 billion in debt while 
under United Nations sanctions.38 The existence of these sanctions did not 
automatically erase the obligation of the new, Nelson Mandela-led African 
National Congress government to pay the debts. But enforcing debt claims 
against a recalcitrant sovereign is not easy, and as a practical matter collecting 
payment on the debts would have been difficult, if not impossible. 
And yet South Africa’s new government paid in full the debts of its apartheid 
predecessor.39 One likely explanation is that South Africa feared that repudiating 
the apartheid-era sovereign debt would hurt its future borrowing prospects.40 The 
question that interests us is whether, as a financial matter, South Africa made the 
right decision.41 Do markets indeed reward the payment of sinful debts? 
The case of King Leopold’s debts provides traction on this question because 
Belgium, which could have stiffed Leopold’s creditors when it took over the CFS, 
did not.42 Like South Africa in 1994, Belgium paid the sinful debts. And because 
Belgium had its own bonds trading at the time when the decision to pay the King 
Leopold’s sinful bonds was made, we can examine how investors in Belgian 
bonds reacted. 
The economic theory of sovereign lending and borrowing often distinguishes 
between defaults that the market is willing to excuse (for example, defaults 
caused by factors out of the sovereign’s control, such as an unexpected weather 
event) and those that it sees as a sign of irresponsibility (for example, a default 
 
(citing the United States Consul-General’s report that the CFS was not really a state but “one 
tremendous commercial organization”). 
 38.  See, e.g., Jeff Rubin, Challenging Apartheid’s Foreign Debt, PROBE INT’L (Apr. 1997), http:// 
probeinternational.org/library/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/RUBIN.pdf [https://perma.cc/LF68-YK32]. 
 39.  Mariam Isa, Apartheid Debt Settled, FIN24 (Sept. 3, 2001), https://www.fin24.com/Economy/ 
Apartheid-debt-settled-20010903 [https://perma.cc/633B-CGJ6]. 
 40.  For discussions of the reputational considerations, see, for example, STEPHANIA BONILLA, LAW 
AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVES 36 (2010); Unforgiveable, ECONOMIST (Apr. 24, 1999), https:// 
www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/1999/04/22/unforgivable [https://perma.cc/P6RZ-TLHQ]. 
 41.  Best we know, there is no research on this question as of yet. It is, however, one of the projects 
we are contemplating. 
 42.  Of course, Belgium was differently situated in other ways, including the fact that it—more than 
South Africa’s new government—had directly benefited from the prior borrowing. See infra Part V. 
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caused by excessive spending).43 Did the market see Belgium’s payment of the 
CFS debts as a sign that Belgium was a good debtor who paid those debts it might 
have resisted? Or did it see Belgium as an irresponsible debtor squandering 
resources on debts which the markets would have excused? Theory alone does 
not answer this question, so we use empirics.44 
 
III 
BACKGROUND ON COLONIAL BONDS AND OUR DATA 
To understand our analysis of the CFS bonds, it helps to situate the analysis 
within the context of the broader literature on bonds of colonies. These bonds 
have received substantial attention from economists. In particular, research on 
British colony bonds suggests that they traded at lower YTMs than what local 
economic conditions would have warranted.45 That is, they were perceived as less 
risky than they should have been. 
Scholars have suggested that the imperial power or mother country provided 
an implicit guarantee of the colonial bonds.46 Despite the implicit guarantee, 
bonds issued by the imperial power itself usually trade at lower YTMs than bonds 
issued under the name of its colonies. However, the difference observed between 
these YTMs may reflect differences in other factors such as liquidity (with the 
mother country having greater liquidity).47 
Colonial status does not, however, unambiguously provide a borrowing 
benefit. Some researchers find, for example, that there are periods of history—
such as the period between World Wars I and II—when the benefit disappears.48 
For example, once Britain left the gold standard, investors began to reassess 
 
 43.  See generally Hershel I. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: 
Excusable Default, Repudiation and Reputation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 1088 (1988) (identifying this market 
distinction). 
 44.  This question has come up recently in the contexts of Mozambique and Malaysia. See Mark 
Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, Mozambique’s Guarantees on the Tuna Bonds: Can They be Repudiated?, 
CREDITSLIPS (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2019/01/mozambiques-guarantees-
on-the-tuna-bonds-can-they-be-repudiated.html [https://perma.cc/54LN-2244]; Mitu Gulati, Holiday 
Reading Recommendation and a Research Question, CREDITSLIPS (Nov. 25, 2018), https://www. 
creditslips.org/creditslips/2018/11/holiday-reading-recommendation-and-a-research-question-on-the-
1mdb-case.html [https://perma.cc/4NG7-MD5U]. 
 45.  See generally A.K. CAIRNCROSS, HOME AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT 1870-1913: STUDIES IN 
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 222–35 (1953) (discussing how foreign investment in colonies traded at a 
premium compared to the risk for default); LANCE E. DAVIS & ROBERT A. HUTTENBACK, MAMMON 
AND THE PURSUIT OF EMPIRE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BRITISH IMPERIALISM 1860-1912 (1986). 
 46.  See Olivier Accominotti, Marc Flandreau & Riad Rezzic, The Spread of Empire: Clio and the 
Measurement of Colonial Borrowing Costs, 64 ECON. HIST. REV. 385, 400 (2011) (“[P]owers with an 
international credit ended up acquiring subject nations and . . . signaled ownership, and this was reflected 
in the market.”). The data was kindly put at our disposal by the authors at http://eh.net/database/global-
finance/ [https://perma.cc/T5Y6-ZD8A]. 
 47.  Matthieu Chavaz & Marc Flandreau, High & Dry: The Liquidity and Credit of Foreign 
Government Debt in the First Age of Globalization (1880-1910), 77 J. ECON. HIST. 653, 686 (2017). 
 48.  Maurice Obstfeld & Alan M. Taylor, Sovereign Risk, Credibility and the Gold Standard: 1870-
1913 versus 1925-31, 113 ECON. J. 241, 265–66 (2003). 
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Britain’s willingness (and ability) to guarantee bonds issued by its colonies. 
Independence movements, such as that in India, also led investors to question 
whether the guarantee would hold if the movements were successful.49 
The case of the CFS differs from the typical colonial bonds in multiple ways. 
First, the CFS was not, strictly speaking, a colony of an imperial power. It was 
effectively the private property of the monarch of Belgium—King Leopold II—
and, in that sense, an independent state. One, therefore, might not expect its 
bonds to receive the benefit of an implicit Belgian guarantee—at least not until 
it transitioned to a Belgian colony in 1908.50 
Second, the CFS went from being an independent state with bonds on the 
international market to being a colony. That kind of transition is rare, as a 
historical matter, since most transitions occur in the opposite order. It is even 
more uncommon to have data on bonds issued by the country before and after 
its change of status, which allows us here to examine how the transition affected 
bond YTM. 
Over its existence between 1885 and 1908, the CFS issued several loans. Table 
1 lists the details of these. 
Table 1. List of Loans Issued by the CFS51 
Loan Decree Amount in BEF Convertibility Other Elements 
2.5%  
1887 Loan 
July 5, 
1887 422,200 No mention 
As reimbursement for former member 
of the Comité d’Etudes du Haut Congo 
1888 Lottery 
Loan 
February 7, 
1888 150,000,000 No mention Lottery 
4% 1896 October 17, 1896 1,500,000 
Not convertible for ten 
years after the issue 
Issued to cover extraordinary expenses 
linked to public works in the CFS 
4% 1898 June 14, 1898 12,500,000 
Not convertible for ten 
years after the issue 
Issued to cover extraordinary expenses 
linked to public works in the Congo 
4% 1901 October 15, 1901 50,000,000 
Not convertible before 
1922 
Issued to cover extraordinary expenses 
linked to public works in the Congo 
3% 190452 February 1, 1904 30,000,000 
Not convertible for ten 
years after the issue 
Issued to cover extraordinary expenses 
linked to public works in the Congo 
4% 1906 June 3, 1906 10,000,000 
Exchangeable for a 3% 
Belgian loan in case of 
annexation (option 
valid for five years) 
Linked to railway construction. 
Advance for an authorized issue to take 
place later 
 
 49.  See Nicolas Degive & Kim Oosterlinck, Independence and the Effect of Empire: The Case of 
“Sovereign Debts” Issued by British Colonies, 38 (Ctr. Emile Bernheim, Working Paper No. 19-018, 
2019), https://ideas.repec.org/p/sol/wpaper/2013-294694.html [https://perma.cc/FRC2-LAGZ]. 
 50.  See Blocher & Gulati, supra note 4, at 1220. 
 51.  See generally Situation Financière et Budget Colonial, in No. 590, Ministère des Finances, Oud 
fonds, Archives Générales du Royaume, Brussels, Belgium (MIFINOUD); see also Fonds 
d’Amortissement de l’emprunt à lot de l’E.I. [hereinafter Fonds d’Amortissement], in No. 590, 
MIFINOUD; CONGO BELGE: RECUEIL ADMINISTRATIF DES FINANCES FASC. II app. at 29–32 (1912), 
in No. 592, MIFINOUD. 
 52.  This bond as well as the 1901 bond only met limited success. An internal memo from the Belgian 
Ministry of Finance states that only half of the 3% loan had actually been issued and a notable part of 
the 4% loan was still available for sale. See Emprunts Décrétés par l’Etat Indépendant depuis 1901, in No. 
589, MIFINOUD. 
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Loan Decree Amount in BEF Convertibility Other Elements 
4% Treasury 
Bills NA 2,040,000 No mention 
Advance for an authorized issue to take 
place later 
  
 Some of the bonds listed in Table 1 had unusual features, making them 
difficult to use for our purposes: the lottery feature of the lottery bond of 1888, 
the limited liquidity of the partially issued bond of 1901, and the short maturity 
of the Treasury Bills of 1908. We exclude these three bonds from our analysis for 
these reasons.53 
The 1888 lottery loan was particularly complex. The archives for the Belgian 
Minister of Finance show numerous attempts to assess the YTM of this bond.54 
Part of the complication was that the market did not take up all of the bond issue 
at issuance, thereby changing the originally estimated likelihood of a lottery 
win—a factor that then influenced the real YTM of the bond (only 916,875 out 
of 1,500,000 bonds were successfully marketed).55 To make things more complex, 
the CFS then passed a decree to convert the lottery bond into a 3% perpetuity in 
September 1903.56 But that attempt created controversy and was eventually 
abandoned.57 All of these events complicate an estimation of the YTM. 
Like the 1888 lottery bond, the 1901 issue also met limited success. Belgian 
stockbroker Oscar Crabbe’s testimony in the trial relating to Leopold’s 
succession suggests that less than half of the bond was initially floated, with bonds 
subsequently being sold up until 1906.58 Again, the lack of accurate information 
regarding how much of the bond was issued and when complicates an accurate 
estimation of its YTM since the bond was likely to be illiquid. 
Finally, twelve million francs worth of Treasury Bills were issued in 1908, 
when Leopold was forced to give up control of the CFS to Belgium.59 We put 
these aside because it is not clear how involved the Belgian government was in 
these final issuances and, more importantly, whether the market perceived it to 
be involved. It seems plausible that investors perceived Belgian government 
involvement since Leopold had essentially been ejected by this point in time and 
the Belgian Finance Ministry was taking over. For example, we know from a 
 
 53.  In addition to the loans in Table 1, the CFS also guaranteed a 25-million-franc loan issued by La 
Compagnie des Chemins de Fer des Grands Lacs, a railway company. See id. 
 54.  See generally No. 587, MIFINOUD. Associating a lottery to a loan was disputed by some on 
moral grounds. The Antwerp stock exchange refused to list this lottery bond, because foreign lottery 
bonds were not allowed on their exchange. Despite pressures from the government, the bond was never 
listed in Antwerp. Emprunt du Congo, LE SOIR, Mar. 19, 1888.  
 55.  Fonds d’ Amortissement, supra note 51.  
 56.  La conversion des lots du Congo, JOURNAL DES FINANCES (Fr), Oct. 3, 1903, at 4. 
 57.  See, e.g., Conversion des lots du Congo (Oct. 06, 1903), in No. 587, MIFINOUD; Conversion de 
l’emprunt à lots du Congo (Oct. 14, 1903), in No. 587, MIFINOUD. The pressure to abandon the plan 
came from the French and Belgian governments. La Conversion des Lots du Congo, JOURNAL DES 
FINANCES (Fr.), Jan. 30, 1904, at 8. 
 58.  Princess Louise of Belgium v. The Belgian State, Cour d’appel [CA] [Court of Appeal] 
Bruxelles, Apr. 2, 1913, Plaidoirie de Me Eugène Hanssens at 136–37.  
 59.  See Note, in No. 591, MIFINOUD. 
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handwritten document from the Belgian Ministry of Finance that the Société 
Générale de Belgique, the Banque Internationale de Bruxelles, and the Banque 
de Paris et des Pays-Bas were involved in these issues.60 
In addition to the foregoing complications, a full set of pricing data for the 
1901 loan and the Treasury Bills was not available. 
 
IV 
ANALYSIS 
With this data in hand, we return to our two primary questions. First, we ask 
whether the markets, once news of Leopold’s despotism became widespread, 
began to impose a sin penalty on his borrowing. Second, we ask whether Belgium 
received a market reward for paying Leopold’s odious debts in full instead of 
trying to repudiate them. 
For each of the CFS bonds included in our dataset, we collected weekly prices 
from the Courrier de la Bourse et de la Banque. 61 The Courrier de la Bourse et de 
la Banque treated the 1896 and 1898 issuances as being the same and gave them 
a single price since they had similar characteristics. Therefore, we also treat them 
as being a single issue. Our sample ranges from January 1900 to December 1910. 
We picked this time range because it covers the period where we can be confident 
that the markets knew about Leopold’s atrocities (around 1903), and goes until 
his removal (1907–08). To be safe, we add in a couple of years of data before and 
after. In general, the prices for all bonds move from week to week, suggesting 
that there was regular trading. To set these prices into perspective we also 
collected prices for the 4% 1909 bond issued by the Belgian Congo (that is after 
the supposedly virtuous takeover by Belgium) and prices for a representative 
Belgian bond.62 
To compare bonds with different maturities and different coupons we 
compute the YTM of the various bonds. The 1896, 1898, and 1906 loans were 
perpetuities. The 1901 and 1909 loans did not have a specific maturity but a 
sinking fund was created to buy them back on the market, and eventually 
extinguish the debt after 99 and 90 years respectively. We treat these bonds as if 
they had these maturities under the assumption that bondholders whose bonds 
 
 60.  Sources available from authors. 
 61.  The prices of all loans discussed in this Article were published weekly on Friday (and in case of 
public holiday, the earliest date before). Pricing data for the CFS 1896 4% and Belgian 3% loans derive 
from research conducted by Sydartha Mikaba Kibingua. See Sydartha Mikaba Kibingua, The Debt of the 
Etat Indépendant du Congo (2012) (unpublished M.Sc. thesis, SBS-EM, Université Libre de Bruxelles) 
(on file with authors). Pricing data for all other loans derive from a physical review of the weekly issues 
of Courrier de la Banque et de la Bourse for the years 1900–10. These issues are available at the 
Bibliotheque Royal de Belgique [Royal Library of Belgium]. All data are on file with Law & 
Contemporary Problems. 
 62.  Decree of the 30 January 1909, amount issued 6,800,000 BEF, coupon 4%, non-convertible 
before 1920, to be amortized in 90 years. 
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had been recalled would use the proceeds of the sale to buy back a similar bond 
in order to maintain the same general portfolio balance.63 
A. Did the Markets Distinguish Between the Earlier and Later Bonds? 
Our first question regarding the CFS debt is whether, as news of Leopold’s 
horrors in the CFS became public, the market began to impose a penalty on his 
borrowing—as researchers report happened with regard to sin stocks or, in the 
sovereign context, with certain Spanish debts in the late 1890s, the Tsarist Bond 
in 1906, and Venezuela’s recent Hunger Bond.64 
Leopold’s borrowing is particularly useful for asking the foregoing question 
since his CFS bond issuances can be put into two distinctive categories: (1) the 
debt issued in his early years, roughly, 1885–1901, when many viewed him as a 
benevolent leader, and (2) the debt issued after 1903 and until his forced removal 
in 1908, by which time the world had learned of the horrors of his rule and that 
his primary motive was personal economic gain. 
To the extent the markets imposed a penalty on sin—particularly on the 
bonds supported by lenders who were aware (or should have been aware) of the 
sin they were financing—we should see a higher market penalty imposed on the 
bonds issued after 1903. 
Below, in Figure 1, we show the YTM patterns for four CFS bonds; in relative 
terms, two virtuous (the pre-1903 issuances) and two sinful (the post-1903 
issuances). The dark vertical line at the end of October 1908 represents the date 
after which assumption of the CFS debts by the Belgian government became 
more certain. The results are remarkable in light of the very different results 
found in Collet (2013), Collet & Oosterlinck (2018) and Gulati & Panizza (2019), 
where the market penalized the sinful bonds.65 For the CFS, despite the fact that 
the sin in question was at least as large, if not many times worse, than in the 
aforementioned cases, there appears to have been no penalty imposed. 
  
 
 63.  This is as in Collet & Oosterlinck, supra note 31. 
 64.  See supra Part II. 
 65.  Collet, supra note 32; Collet & Oosterlinck, supra note 31; Gulati & Panizza, supra note 29. 
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Figure 1. YTM of CFS Bonds66 
 
  
 All four of the YTMs are very close, with the 1904 3% loan slightly lower than 
the others, despite this being one of the sinful bonds. Table 2, which provides 
descriptive statistics for the YTMs of the various bonds, confirms this impression. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the YTMs of the CFS Bonds67 
 1896–98 4% loan 1901 4% loan 1904 3% loan 1906 4% loan 
Period 1900–10 September 1901–10 April 1904–10 September 1907–10 
Minimum 3.96% 3.91% 3.59% 4.03% 
Maximum 4.50% 4.54% 4.42% 4.51% 
Median 4.18% 4.13% 3.93% 4.14% 
Mean 4.18% 4.15% 3.96% 4.24% 
  
 Since the bonds were issued at different points in time, the number of 
observations and the period covered differ across bonds. Despite this, the 
descriptive statistics show a similar pattern for all the CFS bonds with YTMs 
ranging from 3.59% to 4.54%. Basically, over a period of ten years, we see the 
market treating all these bonds in essentially the same fashion. Therefore, the 
data show that the attacks made against Leopold’s horrors in the CFS by the 
international press had at best a marginal impact on the bonds’ YTMs. There is 
 
 66.  The YTM data discussed in this Article derive from the authors’ calculations, relying upon the 
collected prices and expiries of each bond at the relevant date. See supra notes 19, 51, 61 and 
accompanying text. All data are on file with Law & Contemporary Problems. 
 67.  Id. 
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no break around 1904 when the press campaigns against Leopold’s rule were 
prominent. This is opposite the expected outcome based on the results found by 
Collet and Oosterlinck for the 1906 Tsarist Bond and Panizza and Gulati for the 
Venezuelan Hunger Bond.68 In both those episodes, the authors ascribe an 
important role to the press in conveying the odious character of the bond, leading 
to a market penalty. 
As noted earlier, our starting point in expecting the market to apply a price 
discount to the more odious or sinful bonds was two prior episodes at the end of 
the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. The two historical 
episodes had to do with movement in the YTM of Spanish debt backed by Cuban 
revenues following the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the YTM of the 1906 
Tsarist Bond. 
The YTMs we see in Figure 1 and Table 2 stand in contrast with the results 
for the Tsarist Bond, which was denounced as odious by the French press and 
traded at some points in time at a YTM above 7%. This contrast is even stronger 
with the Cuban 5% loan which traded at a YTM of close to 20% during the 
negotiations following the Spanish-American War.69 This YTM reflected, in part, 
the costs of the war. But Collet shows that this bond, singled out as being odious, 
traded at close to 500 basis points more than another Cuban debt not viewed as 
odious.70 The YTM patterns for the CFS and Belgian debts thus confirm that 
market participants were not treating the sinful and virtuous debts differentially. 
Moreover, several bonds had conversion options: the state had the right to 
call back the bonds and ask bondholders either to accept a bond with a lower 
coupon or accept reimbursement.71 Conversion options are similar to call options. 
Bond prices reflect the expected revenues derived from holding the bond minus 
the value of the call option.72 Conversion options thus affect the YTM.73 In fact, 
by not taking this conversion option into account we overestimate the YTM. In 
other words, real YTMs are even smaller than the ones presented in Table 1, and 
the market imposed an even lower penalty than our data would suggest.74 
 
 68.  Collet & Oosterlinck, supra note 31; Gulati & Panizza, supra note 29. 
 69.  Collet, supra note 32; Collet & Oosterlinck, supra note 31. 
 70.  Collet, supra note 32. 
 71.  HENRI LABEYRIE, THÉORIE ET HISTOIRE DES CONVERSIONS DE RENTES SUIVIE D’UNE 
ÉTUDE SUR LA CONVERSION DU 5% FRANÇAIS (1878). 
 72.  In theory it is possible to compute the value of the option and to then compute the YTM. This 
requires making assumptions on the term structure of interest rates for which prices Congolese bonds 
without conversion option are needed. Unfortunately, these data do not exist. 
 73.  Collet & Oosterlinck, supra note 31; Kim Oosterlinck, Loredana Ureche-Rangau & Jacque-
Marie Vaslin, Aristocratic Privilege. Exploiting “Good” Institutions (Ctr. Econ. Policy Research, Working 
Paper No. DP14071, 2019), https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=14071 
[https://perma.cc/9H2C-XX5R]. 
 74.  The overestimation suggests an even lower market penalty on the CFS bonds than the one 
reported previously. The overestimation is nonetheless likely to be small. Indeed, all bonds were 
protected from conversion for a period of time and during our sample period only two bonds (the 1896 
and 1898 loans) could be converted. See supra Table 1. Yet, their YTMs are very close to the YTMs of 
the other 4% loans in our sample suggesting the market attached little value to the option. Further, for 
the conversion option to be valuable, prices of the bond have at least to reach par. Otherwise, the state 
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A different way of getting at the question of whether the markets 
distinguished between the sinful and more virtuous Congo bonds is to examine 
the relative YTMs of the CFS bonds and those of the Belgian Congo. 
Figure 2 compares the YTM from July 1909 (when the Belgian Congo bond 
was first listed) to December 31, 1910. As in Figure 1, the YTMs of the 1904 CFS 
3% bonds are slightly below the others (suggesting that the market liked the 
especially sinful bonds even more than the others). But, generally, the YTM of 
the Belgian Congo 1909 bond is indistinguishable from the CFS bonds. This view 
from Figure 2 is confirmed by the descriptive statistics in Table 3. 
Figure 2. YTMs of the CFS and Belgian Congo Bonds75 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the YTMs of the CFS and Belgian Congo Bonds76 
 CFS Belgian Congo 
 1896–98 4% loan 4% 1901 3% 1904 4% 1906 4% 1909 
Minimum 3.96% 3.91% 3.61% 4.03% 3.90% 
Maximum 4.15% 4.04% 3.96% 4.14% 4.05% 
Median 4.06% 3.98% 3.79% 4.09% 3.97% 
Mean 4.06% 3.98% 3.78% 4.09% 3.97% 
  
 In sum, it does not appear that the market in the two years after the 
annexation of the CFS by Belgium treated its bonds any differently than those of 
 
has no interest in calling the bonds since its current borrowing terms are less advantageous than the 
prevailing term for a given bond. Prices were indeed close to (and even sometimes above) par for the 4% 
bonds but not for the 3% one. With prices never exceeding 85% of par during our sample period, the 3% 
loan was unlikely to be converted. The YTMs on the 3% loan are slightly smaller than the ones observed 
on the other loans. This is consistent with a lower likelihood of conversion. The YTMs computed on the 
3% loan are thus the least affected by the conversion option and will therefore be used as our favorite 
reference afterwards. 
 75.  See supra note 66. 
 76.  Id. 
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FINAL - OOSTERLINCK (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2020  3:56 PM 
64 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:49 
Belgian Congo. The Leopoldian colony and the Belgian colony were viewed by 
investors as essentially the same in terms of moral taint or repudiation risk. And 
this did not necessarily have to be the case, since other researchers have shown 
that the markets of that period were quite capable of distinguishing bonds based 
on their origin.77 
B. Did Belgium Receive a Reward for Paying Leopold’s Bonds? 
To examine whether Belgium received a market reward or penalty for 
choosing to pay the bonds of the CFS in 1908 and thereafter, we first compare 
the YTMs of the bonds of Belgium and the CFS before and after 1908 and then 
examine the spreads between those bonds before and after 1908 in Figures 3 and 
4, respectively. In particular, we are interested in the impact on the YTMs of 
Belgian sovereign bonds after the decision to pay these CFS bonds in 1907–08. 
Drawing from pricing data collected by Mikaba Kibingua,78 we report below 
on a comparison of the YTMs of the CFS 1896–98 loan with the Belgian 3% loan 
on a period ranging from 1899 to 1913. Kibingua finds that the spread between 
the two loans was relatively small.79 As mentioned previously, the 1896–98 loan 
was more likely to be called than the 3% 1904 issuance. The 1904 loan series, 
however, begins later in our sample. We therefore report the YTMs for the 4% 
1896–98 CFS loan, the 3% 1904 loan, and the 3% Belgian loan for the 1900–10 
period in Figure 3. 
  
 
 77.  Stephanie Collet, A Unified Italy: Sovereign Debt and Investor Skepticism 30–31 (Aug, 1, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? [https:// perma.cc/6MJE-2NUD]. 
 78.  See Mikaba Kibingua, supra note 61. 
 79.  See generally id. Her analysis reports semi-annual yield to maturity. Based on the raw data we 
computed the yearly YTM. 
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Figure 3. Belgian and CFS Bond YTMs80 
 
  
 As we would expect, the YTMs on the bonds of the European colonizing 
power, Belgium, are lower than those of the CFS. What we are interested in, 
though, is whether Belgium, because of its decision to take on payment of the 
CFS bonds in 1908, was rewarded by the market for its “good debtor” behavior—
paying debts it arguably could have avoided—with a lowering of YTMs on its 
borrowing. Based on reports in the primary financial news outlet at the time, we 
estimate the rough date on which the market would have had confidence that 
Belgium was taking over the CFS debts as somewhere around the last week of 
October 1908.81 If the end of October 1908 is taken as reference point, the 
evolution of the Belgian bond YTMs does not show any form of reward. Indeed, 
the YTMs experienced a slightly increasing trend with an average YTM of 3.15% 
for the period ranging from the end of October 1906 to the end of October 1908, 
and 3.20% from the end of October 1908 to the end of October 1910. Increasing 
the size of the window shows an even more dramatic increase with Belgian YTMs 
reaching a value close to 4% in December 1912. 
 
 80.  See supra note 66. 
 81.  The report in the Journal des Finances reads: 
The law of annexation of Congo to Belgium, whose text has just been published in the Belgian 
Official Journal, draws attention of the market for these securities. Although the law has 
specified that the debts of the colony and the metropolis will remain separate, it is clear that 
Belgium is becoming morally responsible for servicing the Congolese debt, in the same way that 
the French state is morally responsible for the debts of his colonies. However, we know the first-
class security of Belgian finances. It is therefore ensured on the stock market that the prices of 
the Congo Lots, which, in recent days, are already showing signs of effervescence, are to quickly 
exceed the price of 100 francs. 
Notes & Arbitrages, JOURNAL DES FINANCES, Oct. 24, 1908, at 1011 (translation by authors). 
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The CFS bonds, as one might expect, do go down in YTM when the Belgian 
state takes over the responsibility for paying them; news reports demonstrate that 
there was some uncertainty over whether the Belgian state would take on this 
responsibility.82 The transformation of the CFS into a colony was perceived by 
market participants as a sign that Belgium would from then on guarantee the CFS 
debt, and as a result bonds were treated as other colonial bonds were. Figures 4 
and 5 show us what happened. Belgium’s YTMs in the 1907–08 period do not fall, 
either when viewed on their own or in comparison to the CFS bonds. Instead, 
there is a rise in the YTMs. This rise in YTMs may reflect several fears, one of 
which being that Belgium implicitly recognized responsibility for a large debt not 
backed by enough resources. The bottom line: There is no indication that 
Belgium received a YTM benefit for taking on the responsibility for paying 
Leopold’s debts. The ones who did benefit were those creditors who had lent 
Leopold the funds that supported his CFS misadventure. 
Figure 4 provides the spread in the YTMs between the CFS bonds and the 
Belgian bond. This measure allows us to better assess the dynamics of the 
difference in the YTMs. 
Figure 4. Spreads for CFS Bonds83 
 
  
 The spread peaks in 1906 for both loans. It remains generally relatively low. 
This is confirmed by the descriptive statistics presented in Table 4. 
 
 
 82.  See Congo Deficit Likely: Belgium Bound Morally to Stand Sponsor, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 
1908, at 3. 
 83.  See supra note 66. 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of the YTMs of the CFS Bonds, the Belgian Bond, and 
their Spreads84 
 CFS Belgium Spread 
 1896–98 4% loan 1904 3% loan 3% loan 
CFS 1896–98 4% 
loan – Belgium 3% 
CFS 1904 3% loan – 
Belgium 3% 
Period 1900–10 April 1904–10 1900–10 1900–10 April 1904–10 
Minimum 3.96% 3.59% 3.03% 0.73% 0.39% 
Maximum 4.15% 4.42% 3.34% 1.45% 1.38% 
Median 4.06% 3.93% 3.09% 1.06% 0.84% 
Mean 4.06% 3.96% 3.13% 1.06% 0.82% 
  
 For the whole period, and relying on the overestimated YTM of the 1896–98 
loan, the spread ranges from 73 to 145 basis points with an average of 106 basis 
points.85 When comparing the 1904 CFS bond and the Belgian bond YTMs, the 
spread averages only 84 basis points. In both cases the spread declines following 
the annexation, with the lowest values recorded after the annexation. 
As a final comparison, we look at the spreads of a number of British colonies, 
to compare them to those of the CFS and Belgian Congo.86 Figure 5 provides the 
spread with respect to the British consol for Canada, Cape Colony, Ceylon, 
Egypt, India, Jamaica, Mauritius, Natal, New South-Wales, New Zealand, 
Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia. 
Figure 5. Spreads for British Colony Bonds87 
 
 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  By 1910 (the end of our dataset) the 1896–98 could be converted, whereas the 1904 loans still 
had a protection from conversion. The overestimation of the YTM for this bond comes from the fact that 
the value of the conversion option for the bond cannot be accurately estimated. See supra text 
accompanying note 72. 
 86.  The data on YTM spreads between England and her colonies derive from the research by 
Accominotti et al., supra note 46. 
 87.  Id. 
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 What the foregoing tells us is that the figures we discussed earlier for the CFS 
were the norm. Over the whole period the spreads for the British colonies are 
smaller than the CFS ones. However, once annexed to Belgium, the spreads 
become closer, in line with British colonies. If the market penalized the CFS 
bonds, or rewarded Belgium’s guarantee of those CFS bonds, then the spread 
between the CFS and Belgian bonds would have remained greater than the 
spreads of the colonial bonds in Figure 5. 
In other words, Belgium did not receive a market reward for paying for 
Leopold’s sins. The bondholders who funded Leopold did, though. And that 
raises the question of why Belgium paid off the debts; we return to that puzzle in 
the conclusion. 
 
V 
CONCLUSION: WHY DIDN’T THE DOG BARK? 
From the data analyzed above, nothing suggests that the markets imposed 
any penalty on King Leopold’s borrowing, even though there was widespread 
international outrage against his behavior (including within Belgium itself). 
Indeed, the outrage was such that he was forced to give up power. Belgium then 
accepted responsibility for the CFS bonds and paid them, despite the fact that the 
usual explanation for why successor states pay the debts of prior despots—
reputation—does not seem to hold here. 
So, why didn’t the Holmesian dog bark?88 After all, we know from other 
research that markets do often impose a sin penalty on financial securities 
associated with bad behavior.89 There are three potential reasons, all of which 
will require further research to assess. 
A. Self-Interest on the Part of Belgian Officials 
Our first conjecture has to do with possible financial self-interest on the part 
of powerful actors in Belgium. This explanation was raised in 1908 by members 
of the Parti Ouvrier Belge [Belgian Labor Party], when the socialist politician, 
Jules Destrée, accused the members of the right-wing parties of acting in self-
interest to paper over Leopold’s odious debts because to have called them into 
question would have also called into question their own substantial investments 
in the Congo.90 
The Belgian socialist newspaper, Le Peuple, went as far as to publish a list of 
legislators involved in these investments. According to the socialist leader, the 
 
 88.  Sherlock Holmes’ creator, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, was famously a key part of the humanitarian 
campaign against Leopold, along with Mark Twain and Joseph Conrad. See, e.g. ARTHUR CONAN 
DOYLE, THE CRIME OF THE CONGO (1909); Blocher & Gulati, supra note 4, at 1238 n.115. 
 89.  See supra Part II. 
 90.  See generally Séance du Venrendi 18 Juin 1908, 8 Annales Parlementaires de la Chambre des 
Représentants 47–60 (statements of M. Destrée). 
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state taking over the debts of the CFS was a way of legitimizing the problematic 
concessions made to the private firms that many powerful Belgians were 
benefiting from.91 
B. No Press Focus on Bad Bonds 
In both the stories about the 1906 Tsarist Bond and the Venezuelan Hunger 
Bond, the international press focused on and discussed the problematic 
provenance of the bonds in question (for example, that they were issued without 
appropriate legislative approval or severely underpriced).92 In our examination 
of the historical record, we found no articles casting doubt on the validity of any 
of Leopold’s debt issuances at the time they were made. Maybe, for the market 
to impose a penalty on a sin bond, there needs to be a precursor in the form of 
negative press attention that then catches fire.  
C. Belgium’s Own Culpability for Leopold’s Sins 
The final possibility has to do with Belgium’s own culpability regarding the 
exactions made in the Congo. The question of Belgium’s culpability for Leopold’s 
excesses is a much debated one. Leopold, after all, was the king of the Belgians 
all through the period of his rule of the CFS. And while it is clear that there was 
reluctance on the part of the Belgian government to become a colonial power, 
Belgium was one of Leopold’s biggest creditors all through his reign. Indeed, but 
for Belgium providing crucial financial support at key moments, Leopold’s reign 
in the Congo would have likely ended long before it actually did. 
Further, Leopold used his ill-gotten gains to build grand palaces and fancy 
gardens in Belgium.93 So, maybe the markets neither penalized the tainted CFS 
bonds, nor subsequently rewarded Belgium for taking them on, because of a 
collective market judgment that a significant enough portion of the moral taint 
lay with Belgium itself. Belgium, in essence, had primary moral responsibility for 
constraining Leopold (at least as compared to general bondholders) and it, more 
than anyone else, reaped the rewards of Leopold’s bad behavior. 
We have seen from the prior research described in Part II that markets can 
and do sometimes impose penalties on immoral behavior. But perhaps what we 
are seeing here is that there are limits to crowdsourced disapproval; that it is a lot 
less effective in penalizing bad behavior when judgements about comparative 
fault are at issue.94 And that then leads to the question of whether there is a need 
 
 91.  Id. at 31 (“The interest of the concessionary companies in Belgium taking over the succession 
of the Congo Free State is not debatable . . . . If Belgium assumes, as regular and valid, the obligations of 
the Congo Free State, the interests of the companies are fully insured.”). 
 92.  See Collet & Oosterlinck, supra note 31, at 218; Panizza & Gulati, supra note 27, at 28. 
 93.  Jean Stengers, King Leopold’s Imperialism, in STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF IMPERIALISM 248, 
261 (Roger Owen & Bob Sutcliffe eds., 1972) (noting that Leopold “did make money out of the Congo, 
but he used it almost exclusively to enrich the Belgian national heritage by acquiring property, building 
monuments and developing towns”). 
 94.  As of this writing, there has been little consideration in the odious debt literature of situations 
where judgements about comparative fault need to be made. See generally Mitu Gulati & Omri Ben-
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for formal legal sanctions, and how that sanctioning mechanism may best be 
designed.  
 
 
Shahar, Partially Odious Debts?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2007, at 47, for a conversation on 
the potential allocation of odious debt costs among parties after a despot has been dethroned. 
